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Employed and Unemployed Search:
The Marginal Willingness To Pay
For Attributes in Lithuania, the US and the Netherlands
Abstract. This paper introduces a method for estimating workers' marginal willingness to pay for
job attributes employing data on job search activity. Worker's willingness to pay to avoid a
temporary contract, which increases the risk of becoming unemployed, is derived for Lithuania.
The empirical relevance of this method is further shown re-interpreting studies that examine
search behaviour in the U.S. and the Netherlands. We provide estimates of workers' willingness
to pay for a wide range of job attributes including the risk of becoming unemployed and
promotion prospects. Further, we discuss and apply a method for estimating unemployed
individuals' willingness to pay for recall opportunities and the residual entitlement period. JEL:
J3, J6.
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the eighteenth century, when Adam Smith wrote "The Wealth of Nations", economists
have been interested in how the theory of compensating wage differentials might explain the
existence of wage differences in the labour market. One of the attractions of this theory is that it
allows for the estimation of workers' marginal willingness to pay (MWP) for job attributes such
as collective bargaining and the risk of becoming unemployed. This may explain the impressive
number of empirical hedonic wage studies that have focused on the workers' willingness to pay
for attributes. Although many studies have shown that non-wage differences between jobs can be
significant to workers, the general conclusion is that non-wage differences between jobs are not
very important to workers (see Brown, 1980; Rosen, 1986).
The theory of compensating wage differentials assumes that workers have complete
information in a static environment. This suggests that if job outcomes are a result of a dynamic
process and workers having to search for jobs, estimates for the willingness to pay for job
attributes may be biased (Epple, 1987). These considerations have encouraged theoretical
research that looks at the willingness to pay for attributes. In particular, it has been demonstrated3
that the estimates of the conventional marginal willingness to pay for a job attribute are likely to
be biased downwards if it is not acknowledged that a job is a search good and a result of a match
between an employer and a worker (Hwang et al., 1992). For example, if firms differ with respect
to the cost of providing nonwage job attributes, then low cost firms offer both higher wages and
greater values of desirable job attributes, because they face greater opportunity costs in having
job vacancies go unfilled. This example may be particularly relevant in the context of the risk of
unemployment, because more profitable firms are less likely to make employees redundant.
These considerations have generated a number of studies aimed at estimating the MWP
for job attributes using data on job moving behaviour and comparing the MWP estimates with
conventional estimates (Herzog and Schlottmann, 1990; Gronberg and Reed, 1994; Van
Ommeren et al., 2000).
1 These studies point to considerably higher estimates than those based on
conventional hedonic wage methods. Herzog and Schlottmann (1990) and Gronberg and Reed
(1994) reported higher estimates for the willingness to pay to avoid job-induced risk. Van
Ommeren et al. (2000) found higher estimates for the willingness to pay to avoid commuting.
Similarly, Bartik et al. (1992) compared the MWP for residential characteristics based on
residential moving behaviour and hedonic price methods and showed that the MWP estimates for
crime reduction and school quality are higher than those based on conventional estimates. In
addition, McCue and Reed (1996) examined self-reported data on the workers' willingness to pay
for job attributes, and concluded that "workers' valuations of nonpecuniary dimensions of work
are substantially larger than previous research has indicated".
Given the frequent use of hedonic-based models to assess the benefits of environmental,
health and safety regulations in the labour and housing market, these results are relevant for
theoretical and applied research and policy makers. "Hedonic-based benefit estimates shou1d be
used with caution, and other benefit estimation approaches should receive greater emphasis."
(Bartik et al., 1992).
In this paper, we develop a method to estimate the MWP for job attributes that explicitly
acknowledges that jobs are search goods. Assuming initially an elementary stationary
environment in which workers search for jobs, we demonstrate that the workers' MWP for job
attributes can be derived from data on job search activity. This estimation method is conceptually
related to studies in which MWP estimates are derived from data on job moving behaviour by4
application of search theory (Gronberg and Reed, 1994; Van Ommeren et al., 2000).
We relax the assumptions regarding the search environment. We allow workers to search
in a nonstationary environment and follow the literature by presuming that workers are
involuntarily separated due to firm firings (see also Gronberg and Reed, 1994). Importantly, we
extend the literature by assuming that the separation rate may depend on job attributes. This
extension is essential, because the current literature explicitly assumes that the separation rate is
exogenous of job attributes. Gronberg and Reed (1994, p. 913) state "The assumption that the
separation rate is exogenous of firm wage and nonwage characteristics is crucial for empirically
identifying workers' marginal willingness to pay for job attributes." Khanker (1988) employs the
identical exogeneity assumption in his work on compensating wage differentials. The exogeneity
assumption is clearly not innocuous (Hamermesh et al., 1994) and limits the applicability of the
MWP method. Moreover, by allowing the separation rate to depend on job attributes, we are able
to generate estimates of the MWP for job attributes that are related to the unemployment risk
(e.g. duration of employment contract).
2
The method developed here is used primarily to estimate the workers' willingness to pay
for job attributes. However we will also discuss the possibilities of applying the same method to
the estimation of the unemployed individuals' willingness to pay for unemployment attributes. In
the current paper, we will provide estimates of the unemployed individuals' willingness to pay for
the expectation of being recalled from layoff and for the residual entitlement period of receiving
unemployment benefit.
Our estimation method, which is based on observations of job search, will be applied to
estimate the workers' MWP to avoid temporary contracts and other job attributes in Lithuania.
Further, we will re-interpret four previously published studies to calculate the MWP for job
attributes and unemployment attributes in the Netherlands and USA.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section two we introduce an elementary search
model. We then derive the optimal search strategy in section three and derive the workers'
marginal willingness to pay for non-wage job attributes. In section four, we generalise the search
                                                                                                                                                                                   
1 In addition, these considerations have generated a number of studies to improve conventional estimates by
correcting for mobility bias (see, for example, Kim, 1992).
2 In the literature on the theory of compensating wage differentials there is a large interest in MWP estimates of the
risk of becoming unemployed (Rosen, 1986). Compensating wage differentials estimation methods are plagued by
the endogeneity of job riskiness (Garen, 1988; Moretti, 2000). As is well known, search theory is particularly well
suited to the analysis of the effect of risk on labour market behaviour (Mortensen, 1986).5
model to increase the empirical relevance of the estimation method. Section five pays special
attention to the unemployed individuals' MWP for unemployment attributes. In section six, the
estimation method for the MWP is discussed. The empirical relevance of the method to estimate
the individuals MWP for attributes is then demonstrated in section seven. Section eight concludes
the paper.
2. THE ELEMENTARY SEARCH MODEL
The point of departure in this paper is an employed individual. This individual derives utility
from job attributes X. v(X) is the quasi-concave instantaneous utility function associated with a
job having attributes X. The once-only loss in utility due to moving job equals c. The person
searches in the labour market with effort s at a cost of k(s), s ‡0. Search costs k(s) are increasing
and convex in search effort s, hence k'(s) > 0 and k"(s) > 0. Jobs arrive with arrival rate p(s). The
job arrival rate p is increasing and concave in s, hence p'(s) > 0 and p"(s) < 0. We suppose that
the effects of the search costs on the instantaneous utility function are additive, hence v(X,s) =
v(X) - k(s). Job attributes offers are drawn randomly from a given distribution, which is
independent of X.
3 X0 denotes the attributes of the job offered to the job searcher. Pooling of
offers is not allowed: job offers are either refused or accepted before other offers arrive.
The expected lifetime utility received from the current job is denoted as V(X). Future
utility is discounted at rate r.  V includes the possibility of offers in the future. The individual is
assumed to maximise lifetime utility V. The decision whether to accept a job offer accounts for
expected future offers. Discounted lifetime utility can then be written as the sum of the
instantaneous utility and the expected benefit of accepting a job offer during the next time unit
(we assume that workers live forever). This leads to the following equation:
rV(X) = v(X) -k(s)+p(s)Emax[V(X0)-c-V(X),0].                                           (1)
In this expression the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of the job attributes X0.
The interpretation of the above formula is well known. Note that at rate p(s) a job offer will be
received, and that offer will be accepted if the value of the new job exceeds that of the current6
position plus the moving costs. Hence, the optimal acceptance strategy is to accept a job offer if
V(X0) -c -V(X) > 0. The offer should otherwise be rejected. In the case that job moving costs c
are zero, the optimal acceptance strategy can be simplified: accept a job offer if v(X0) -v(X) > 0,
otherwise reject the offer.
3. THE MARGINAL WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR JOB ATTRIBUTES
In this section, the choice of search effort s is derived using the first-order condition for the
worker's optimal search effort. The optimal choice of s is obtained by differentiating equation (1)
with respect to s, and setting the resultant to zero:











.                                                   (2)
The interpretation of equation (2) is well known (Mortensen, 1986). The marginal search costs
equals the marginal benefit of an increase in the job arrival rate. The second-order condition is
that the left-hand side of equation (2) is decreasing in s. The concavity of p and the convexity of
k in their arguments ensure that this condition will be satisfied. For nearly all workers, optimal
search effort s will be positive, because the marginal search costs will be close to zero for the first
unit of search and the marginal benefit from the first unit will be large. So, following Hey and
McKenna (1979) and Van den Berg (1992), we will assume that workers are always involved in
on-the-job search.
We will use equation (2) to express the marginal change of a change in a job attribute Xi
on the workers' search effort. Dividing both sides by ¶p/¶s, differentiating with respect to Xi and
using the envelope theorem (¶V/¶s = 0), gives:
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3 In case the employed individual considers taking a second job, the distribution of job attributes of both jobs
depends on X, so this assumption is violated. The proportion of workers that consider a second job is small. In the
data we analyse later on, only 0.4% of all workers (4.3% of all searchers) search for a second job.7
where Pr[V(X0) -c -V(X) > 0] denotes the probability of accepting a job offer and where i = 1,...,
n+1. Suppose that the n+1's job attribute is the wage. The workers' marginal willingness to pay
for the ith nonwage job attribute (MWPi) is then defined as the ratio of the marginal lifetime
utility of the ith job attribute over the marginal lifetime utility of the wage. Hence, by using
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where i= 1,...,n. Our first result is that the workers' marginal willingness to pay for the ith non-
wage job attribute, MWPi, equals the ratio of the marginal effects of the ith non-wage attribute
and the wage on search effort, conditional on search.
Our second result is also straightforward to obtain. Since V= V(v(X),s(X)), and using the
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Thus, we have shown that the ratio of the marginal lifetime utility of the job attributes equals the
ratio of the marginal instantaneous utility of the job attributes. As a consequence, the MWPi is
equal to the ratio of the marginal instantaneous utility of the ith job attribute over the marginal
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Consequently, the ratio of the marginal effects of the ith non-wage attribute and the wage
on the search effort equals the marginal instantaneous utility of the ith job attribute over the
marginal instantaneous utility of the wage, conditional on search. In summary, given information8
on ¶s/¶Xi/¶s/¶w, one obtains (i) the MWPi for job attribute Xi; (ii) the ratio of the marginal
effects of job attribute Xi over the wage on the instantaneous utility function.
4. THE SEARCH ENVIRONMENT REVISITED
The on-the-job search model introduced in section 2 is the standard theoretical framework to
understand on-the-job search. For empirical applications however, it may be too simplistic. It is
therefore useful to investigate whether the results derived above still hold under weaker, and
therefore more realistic, conditions.
Nonstationarity. Empirical applications of on-the-job search and job moving behaviour
indicate that workers are active in a nonstationary environment. In particular, on-the-job search
activities decrease with the time being in the current job (Kahn and Low, 1984; Parsons, 1991;
Van Ophem, 1991). We will therefore introduce time 't' into the model, which denotes the job
duration (tenure). We suppose that the structural parameters of the search environment (v, p, c, k
and d) are nonstationary and depend on t (see Van den Berg, 1990). This implies that lifetime
utility is nonstationary, so V= V(t), and, therefore, search effort is nonstationary, so s = s(t).
Unemployment. It is natural to assume that the employed individuals take into account
that they may become unemployed in the future. We assume that unemployed individuals will
receive a benefit b. Let d denote the involuntary separation rate of workers from jobs. We
emphasise that d may depend on job nonwage attributes X, so d = d(X). For example, temporary
employment contracts generally increase the risk of becoming unemployed.
4 Given the
assumptions stated above, lifetime utility V(X) satisfies the following equation derived in the
same way as equation (1):
       rV(X) = ¶V(X)/¶t + v(X) - k(s) + p(s)Emax[V(X0) - c - V(X),0] + d(X)[U(b) - V(X)].       (7)
Equation (7) can be interpreted as follows (see, similarly, Van den Berg, 1990). The lifetime
utility forgone per unit of time is equal to the sum of the appreciation of lifetime utility V at t, the
                                                       
4 In essence, MWP estimates can be derived from the relationship between X and voluntarily behaviour. As
emphasised in the introduction, MWP estimates based on observations of job moves need to rely on the assumption
that d does not depend on X (Gronberg and Reed, 1994). This assumption is needed, because job moves consist of
voluntary and involuntary job moves, which are not distinguishable. In contrast, job search is always voluntarily,
even if triggered by a threat of involuntary separation.9
instantaneous utility, the expected benefit of accepting a job offer and the expected loss of
becoming unemployed, where U denotes the lifetime utility of an unemployed individual.
The optimal choice of s can be obtained by differentiating equation (7) with respect to s,
and setting the resultant equal to zero. Going through the same mathematical steps as in the
previous sections - and making use of the optimality condition that ¶(¶V/¶t)¶s = ¶(¶V/¶s)/¶t = 0
- we find again that MWPi = ¶s/¶Xi/¶s/¶w.
We see now that lifetime utility cannot be written as V(v(X),s(X)), but only as
V(v(X),s(X),X), since lifetime utility depends directly on X via d(X). As a consequence,
¶V/¶Xi/¶V/¶w cannot be written as ¶v/¶Xi/¶v/¶w. This implies that the ratio of the marginal
effects of the ith nonwage attribute and the wage on the search effort does not equal the marginal
instantaneous utility of the ith job attribute over the marginal instantaneous utility of the wage. In
summary, under the weaker conditions as stated in this section, one may interpret ¶s/¶Xi/¶s/¶w as
MWPi, however identification of the ratio of the marginal effects on the instantaneous utility
function is not possible.
5. UNEMPLOYMENT
In previous sections, we have discussed the relationship between on-the-job search effort and
workers’ marginal willingness to pay for job attributes. In principle, unemployed’ search can be
modelled in the same way as employed’ search and hence the MWP method is applicable to
unemployed’ search. Consequently, the unemployed individuals' marginal willingness to pay for
non-pecuniary attributes that explicitly depend on the current state of unemployment can be
derived by supposing that the n+1's attribute is the unemployment benefit b. An example of such
an unemployment non-pecuniary attribute is the expectation of being recalled to the previous job
from layoff. Another example is the residual entitlement period.
6. ESTIMATION METHOD
We will discuss here a method for estimating workers’ MWP for job attributes given information
on search behaviour. Suppose that exact information on search efforts s is not available and it is
only known whether workers report that they search (s* = 1) or do not search (s* =0). Workers
report that they search when search effort exceeds a (unknown) threshold value. One may then
specify search activity s* by means of a latent-variable framework: s = b'Y + u, E(u) = 0; b is a10
vector of unknown coefficients. Y represents a vector of explanatory variables and Y includes job
attributes X; u is a random variable with expectation 0; s and s* are related as follows: s* = 1, if s
> c (where c is an arbitrary threshold value); s* = 0 otherwise. Estimation of this discrete choice
model is standard.
Let bi the parameter associated with job attribute Xi, i= 1,..., n+1. It is then obvious that
¶E(s)/¶Xi = bi, i= 1,...n+1. Suppose now that the n+1's job attribute is the wage and let bw be the
parameter associated with the wage. The ratio of the marginal effects of the ith nonwage attribute
and the wage on expected search effort is then equal to bi/bw and thus:
   MWPi = bi/bw ,    1, …., h.                                                             (8)
In consequence, estimates of bi/bw can be interpreted as the workers' marginal willingness
to pay for the ith non-wage job attribute (MWPi). This result also holds when one observes search
effort in a different way. For example, one may observe the number of search hours per week
(leading to a truncated variable model, which, like the discrete choice model, relies on the latent
variable linearly related to attributes, see Greene (2000, p. 908)) or the number of search contacts
per week (leading to a Poisson model with expected number of contacts linearly related to
attributes, Greene (2000, p. 880)).
The assumption that search effort depends linearly on the job attributes implies that the
workers' MWP does not depend on any current wage or nonwage job attribute (see equation (8)).
In most empirical applications of on-the-job search behaviour however, it is assumed that the
wage determines search effort non-linearly. The most common specification is that the logarithm
of the wage determines search effort. Such a specification implies that the MWPi equals w.bi/bw.
Hence, the MWPi is proportional to the current wage. The unemployed individuals' MWP for
unemployment attributes can be estimated in a similar way. On the other hand, it is common to
include both linear and quadratic terms in age, tenure and working hours as explanatory




In this section, we estimate workers' marginal willingness to pay for a range of job attributes in
Lithuania in the year 2000. Our emphasis is on the MWP for the type of contract and in particular
temporary contracts. Temporary contracts are clearly associated with higher than average
unemployment risk.
5   
Lithuania is one of the former Soviet republics, which by the end of 2000 was at the end
of its first decade of transition to the market economy. Labour force participation in Lithuania
was then close to the EU average, but the unemployment rate (16.1 percent according to ILO
definition) was high by EU standards. By this time, unemployment had been continuously rising
for more than two years (and kept on rising in the beginning of 2001), suggesting that workers
were concerned about the risk of losing job.
6 This is a suitable case for studying MWP to avoid
such a risk.
7.2 Data, descriptives and methods
Our data come from the national labour force survey (LFS) conducted by the Statistical
Department of Lithuania in November 2000. 3 thousand households were randomly drawn from
the household register and all (available) members of these households aged 15 and older were
interviewed. From this sample of over 7.5 thousand individuals, employed individuals were
selected. After excluding those working abroad and cases with missing information we are left
with 2641 observations of workers. In the LFS, employed individuals are asked whether they are
involved in a search activity for another job.
                                                       
5 Data for Lithuania indicate that workers with temporary contracts in 1999 have a 22% probability of being
unemployed one year later. By comparison, those with permanent contracts have merely a 6% probability of being
unemployed one year later. Moreover, workers with temporary contracts are also several times more likely to leave
the labour force.
6 Subjective questions on the value of work in the Baltic states (UNDP, 1998, p. 60) as well as regular public opinion
polls show that job security is the most important characteristic of work for workers. The main explanation is
plausibly the combination of high unemployment rates and low levels of unemployment and welfare benefits.
Lithuania's unemployment benefits do not follow an insurance principle and are maximally two-third of the minimum
wage and less than half of the average gross wage. Furhermore, most unemployed do not receive unemployment
benefits. The bottom line is that the welfare loss from becoming unemployed is larger for workers in Lithuania than
for EU workers.12
Incidence of on-the-job search is 8.8 percent.
7 Table 1 reveals that temporary workers,
8 as
well as part-time workers and those with short tenures are much more likely to search. Workers
with short temporary contracts (less than 6 months) are more likely to be engaged in search than
those with longer temporary contracts. The descriptives indicate that temporary and part-time
males search more often than their female counterparts. Nevertheless, compared to data from
West-European countries, observed search differences between males and females are relatively
small. For example in the UK and in the Netherlands, part-time female workers search on average
less than their full-time counterparts (e.g. Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1994), whereas in Lithuania
they search more.
9 This phenomenon is thought to be related to the strong employment position
of females in the Baltic labour markets (OECD, 2002). This justifies our procedure to pool
initially observations for both gender.
Subjective information indicates that 53% of the searchers state that they search because
they wish to improve their working conditions, 20% search because the current job is anticipated
to be terminated or seen as transitional and 20% search to increase the number of the hours
worked (see Table 2).
10 Table 2 also suggests that the reasons for search are similar for males and
females. The data suggest that part-time work is not seen as attractive in Lithuania. Part-time
workers tend to search in particular because they wish to increase the number of working hours.
As one might expect, most temporary workers search because the current job will be terminated
or is seen as transitional.
MWP estimates have been derived using a logit model.
11 We will also report estimates
correcting for sample selection of workers using a standard Heckman correction and estimates for
males and females separately.
                                                       
7 Incidence of on-the-job search including search for a second job is only slightly higher (9.2%). This percentage is
comparable to EU countries. For example, the same percentage is reported in the Netherlands (Statistics Netherlands,
1992). In the UK, somewhat lower percentages are reported (Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1994).
8 Temporary workers are defined as workers with non-permanent employment contracts. The average contract
duration is just under 6 months. About 70% of the contracts are for no more than 6 months.
9 In this sense, the Lithuanian labour market is more similar to the US labour market.
10 Respondents were allowed to choose only one reason.
11 Post-stratifying weights provided by the Statistical Department of Lithuania were used in the estimation process.
Reported standard errors are the robust ones and allow for clustering within households. MWP estimates appear to be
insensitive to the use of weights. Results without weights can be received from the authors upon request.13
7.3 Results
In the baseline model we include one job attribute associated with the risk of unemployment:
whether workers have, or have not, a temporary contract. Other job attributes included are night
work and weekend work, which are generally thought of as attributes that reduce welfare. The
number of working hours is also included. A priori, it is not clear whether the number of hours is
less or more than the workers' optimal number of hours.
12
We have estimated a range of models, including a range of control variables for worker
and firm characteristics.
13 Further, we control for the local unemployment rate (county and
gender specific) and the percentual annual change in employment in the industry of employment.
In Table 3, the full results of the baseline model can be found. In Table 4, we provide the MWP
estimates given four different specifications.
14 Specification (1) distinguishes between workers
with temporary contract durations up to 6 months (short contracts) and contract durations of more
than 6 months (long contracts).
15 Specification (2) includes a dummy for temporary jobs and a
contract duration variable (if the job is temporary, otherwise 0). Specification (3) uses a spline
contract duration variable to test whether the MWP is higher for short contracts. Specification (4)
uses subjective information on the reason why the contract worker is temporarily employed,
distinguishing between ‘involuntarily temporary contracts’ (e.g., “could not find permanent job”)
and ‘voluntarily temporary contracts’ (e.g., “Did not want a full-time job”, “A contract covering a
period of training” etc). In Table 5, we provide MWP estimates for males and females separately.
In addition, we correct for sample selection.
According to the baseline model (Table 3), workers with temporary contracts are willing
to pay about 190 percent of their monthly wage to get a permanent job.  The estimate for men is
higher than for women (240 and 140 percent respectively, see Table 5). MWP to avoid short
temporary contracts (up to 6 months) is somewhat higher than for long contracts (see Table 4,
specification (1)). Specification (2) suggests that the average MWP for an extra month contract is
                                                       
12 The descriptive data indicate that 11.5 percent of workers would prefer longer hours, while 7.4 percent want to
work less; workers search more when they work part time (see Table 1).
13 We have also experimented with the specifications by including additionally 8 occupation dummies and 23
industry dummies. The main difference is that the MWP for working hours drops from 3.4 to 2.3 percent. The other
MWP estimates remain unchanged. These results can be received from the authors upon request.
14 The full results can be received upon request from the authors.  In addition, overall effect of workers'
characteristics on search effort (encompassing both wage effect and effect on search conditional on wage) can also
be estimated from a logit model like the one in Table 3 where individual (log) wages are replaced with residuals
from the wage equation. MWP estimates do not change .14
around 6 percent. Although specification (3) shows a higher value for durations up to 6 months
(14.9 percent), and virtually zero afterwards. This latter result makes sense, because the value of
a contract extension must increase sharply when the contract duration approaches zero.
Specifications using workers' subjective information on the reason why workers hold a temporary
job suggest that workers whose job is temporary job because they failed to find a permanent one
attach more value to a permanent contract (Table 4; specification (4)). So, the MWP estimate for
temporary jobs is higher for workers who ‘involuntarily’ hold a temporary contract.
Using a simple search model, we will show now that the above estimates which imply that
the willingness to pay to avoid temporary contracts exceeds the wage rate are plausible. Suppose
an individual has a temporary employment contract, earns wage w and anticipates becoming
unemployed at rate d and finding a permanent job at rate q. The individual discounts the future at
rate r. So, lifetime utility V can be written as follows: rV = w+d(U-V)+qV
p, where V
p denotes
the lifetime utility of a permanent contract. When unemployed, this individual will receive a
benefit B (B < w) with probability p < 1 and will find again a temporary job at rate l. In the
permanent job, the individual will earn wage w
p forever, so rV
p = w
p. So, the unemployed
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The willingness to pay (WP) for d is defined as [V(d)-V(0)]/¶V/¶w, so:
                                                                                                                                                                                   
15 The first group of workers has a mean temporary contract of 3.2 months, whereas the second group has a mean
contract duration of 12.9 months.15
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Now suppose that unemployment benefits levels are low, so b = 0 (which will be a
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For most reasonable parameters WP/w < -1. For example, data for Lithuania (OECD,
2002) indicate that l, the annual rate of becoming re-employed, is 0.35 and d, the annual rate of
becoming unemployed for temporary workers, is at least 0.22. Further, q must be larger than r
and w
p must exceed w. Presuming that the discount rate is 0.10 shows now that WP/w is larger
than one in absolute value, so the willingness to pay to avoid a temporary job would be more than
the current wage rate.
16
Further, the empirical results show that the MWP estimates for temporary contracts are
higher for males than for females (see Table 5). When sectoral fall in employment is interacted
with temporary jobs, it turns out that workers working in a declining industry attach considerably
higher values to occupying a permanent position (7.5 percent of the wage per each percentage
point of gender specific decline in industry employment). Presumably, in a declining industry the
chances that a temporary job contract will not be renewed are higher than in other industries.
Temporary workers are a lot more concerned about an employment cut in the sector they work in.
Workers are willing to pay 3.4 percent of their monthly wage rate for an extra working
hour, on average.
17 This might also encompass a risk premium, as longer hours tend to imply
more stable jobs. This estimate is a decreasing function of the number of working hours. For
example, a worker with a 20 hours a week contract values a marginal working hour at 6.0 percent
                                                       
16 Likely, the willingness to pay is higher, because we presume in this simple model that workers are risk neutral, and
we ignore that temporary workers are more likely to leave the labour force.
17 If we include search for a second job in the definition of on-the-job search, it appears that this estimate is slightly
higher (4.3%).16
of the monthly wage,
18 so almost twice as much as the average worker. For workers who work
more than 62 hours a week the MWP for working hours becomes negative.
 About half of all workers work either at nights or on weekends (or both), and these job
attributes proved to have an impact on search activities (especially for men). Workers on average
are willing to pay up to 56 percent of their wage to avoid night work and 34 percent to avoid
weekends (not night) work. These estimates suggest that the discomfort of working at night (or in
the weekends) is substantial. In the literature, estimates based on hedonic models are normally
lower (usually up to 20%), see Kostiuk (1990) and Lanfranchi et al. (2002). When we re-
estimated the model defining search activity including search for a second job the MWP for night
work drops to -49, but the MWP for weekend work becomes statistically insignificant.
Interpretation of the MWP for night weekend work is therefore hazardous. A larger data set is
clearly needed to investigate this further.
Finally, we will discuss the other determinants of the search decision. Results reported in
Table 3 show that likelihood of search decreases with age and tenure (for tenures up to 22
years).
19 Females and ethnic minorities are less likely to search, although both effects are not
statistically significant. Like it was found for the UK by Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1994, tertiary
education promotes on-the-job search. Workers search more when their industry employment
falls. To the extent that a decline in industry employment can be interpreted as a job attribute the
estimates suggest that workers value each percentage point of (gender-and-industry-specific) fall
in annual average employment at 2 percent of the monthly pay, but the precision of this estimate
is too low to interpret this result.
We find that the local unemployment rate has a positive impact on workers' search
effort
20. If the probability of finding a job is low, workers are expected to search less, however
the period of search is increased as the probability of being accepted is small. As a consequence,
the effect of the local unemployment rate on the probability of being observed searching is
theoretically ambiguous a priori.
21
                                                       
18 Other specifications suggest that men value extra hours higher than women, although the difference is not
statistically significant (Table 5).
19 Impact of tenure becomes statistically significant when the sample is restricted to fulltime workers.
20 Positive relationship between local unemployment and on-the-job search was recently documented for the UK by
Fuentes  (2002), but see Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994) and Mekkelholt (1993) for the Netherlands.
21 Our measure of unemployment is gender-specific county level rate based on the LFS conducted one year ago.
Using such predetermined variable avoids possible endogeneity (those who search on-the-job compete for vacancies
with unemployed job-seekers, thus prolonging their unemployment spells).17
7.4 Hedonic wage estimates
As a exploratory exercise, we have also estimated a standard hedonic wage model using the same
regressors (see Table 6). In line with a range of other empirical studies, it appears that a hedonic
wage model based on cross section data gives a theoretically incorrect MWP estimate for a job
attribute associated with the risk of unemployment (see Moretti, 2000, for a review). Temporary
workers are paid (other things equal) less than employees on permanent jobs. The inability to
control for individual characteristics associated with higher probability of unemployment in a
cross section leads clearly to a downward bias in the estimate of compensating differentials. In a
cross section, workers of higher unmeasured ability may earn higher wages and suffer less
unemployment, so that the observed differentials may be wrong-signed (Card, 1987; Moretti,
2000). Workers in declining industries are also underpaid (differential is significant at 1% level).
Monthly pay increases with hours worked (at a rate of 1.5 percent per hour at 38 hours per week),
reaching a maximum at 57 hours per week, so there is no wage compensation for working shorter
hours. Night work does not have a significant impact on earnings.
22 Weekend workers are paid
less than other workers, in contrast with the MWP estimates of the job search model.
These results seem to indicate, in line with a range of other studies (Herzog and
Schlottman, 1990; Gronberg and Need, 1994; Van Ommeren et al., 2000) that workers attach
substantial value to non-wage differences for which they are not compensated. While we do not
know which set of estimates is better, as also argued by Gronberg and Reed (1994), we
emphasise that hedonic wage methods presume that workers are fully compensated and are
perfectly mobile. In particular, these methods exclude the possibility that it takes time for non-
compensated workers to leave the current employer (for example due to lack of information
about other job alternatives).  This presumption does not hold in our sample where a substantial
proportion of workers are involved in on-the-job search. In particular, 53% of male workers with
temporary contracts in our sample search for other jobs. So, the hedonic wage method presumes
that workers are in jobs that maximise their utility, but in our sample, the majority of male
workers with temporary contracts are involved in on-the-job search and are therefore not in jobs
                                                       
22 We have also re-estimated the model including additional controls for industry and occupation. When industry and
occupation are controlled for, the results are identical, except for a positive compensating differential for night work,
but it is much smaller in size (just 9 percent) than the MWP from the search model. If we correct for selectivity, the
night work premium is higher, close to 20 percent, as also shown by Lanfranchi et al. (2002) and Kostiuk (1990), but
still less than the MWP based on the search model.18
that maximise utility. This indicates that the assumption of perfect mobility is not innocuous. So,
this raises the question why individuals accept temporary contracts when they know beforehand
that they are not compensated? Presumably, one answer is that temporary contracts are mainly
accepted by unemployed searchers (and job searchers with temporary contracts of shorter
duration). By accepting a temporary job, unemployed searchers do not forego the opportunity to
search for a permanent job. In equilibrium, these temporary jobs are more likely offered by less
profitable firms, which have lower opportunity costs in having vacancies go unfilled, and which
offer temporary jobs and lower wages (Huang et al., 1992).
23
8. ESTIMATES BASED ON PREVIOUS STUDIES
In this study, we also make use of previous studies of on-the-job search behaviour in order to
derive MWP estimates. We make use of one study that has examined workers' job search
behaviour in the U.S.: Parsons (1991) and one in the Netherlands: Van Ophem (1991). Given the
estimates of the determinants of job search activity as reported in these studies, we derive
workers' MWP for job attributes (section 8.1). Results published by Barron and Mellow (1979)
for the U.S. and Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1993) for the Netherlands on the unemployed
individuals' search behaviour are used to derive the unemployed individuals' MWP for
unemployment attributes (section 8.2).
8.1. On-the-job search
We provide the estimates of the MWP for job attributes using the estimation method discussed in
section 6.
24 To facilitate comparison of the results, we provide estimates of the MWP for a job
attribute divided by the wage (multiplied by 100) denoted as %MWP. One advantage of this
                                                       
23 One of the consequences of non-compensating wage offers, which increase on-the-job search, is that the firm's job
turnover increases. Although this may be an additional cost for many firms due to additional recruitment and loss of
productivity costs, it is plausible that for some firms (e.g. those with a temporary increase in the demand for their
products or those which expect a decrease in future demand) it is advantageous that workers leave after a specified
period.
24 The variance of the estimated MWPi is derived using the delta method, so Var(bi/bw) is calculated as
[Var(bi)+(bi/bw)
2.Var(bw)-2.(bi/bw)Cov(bi/bw)]/bw
2. As it is common practice not to report the covariance matrix of
the coefficients, we suppose that Cov(bi,bw) is zero. Hence, the reported precision of the MWP estimates is
somewhat inaccurate. For the current application, this is not problematic. In the case that MWPi equals zero,
variances of the MWPi estimates are exact, so one may test the hypothesis that MWPi equals zero using a standard t-
test. In addition, when MWPi is positive, the bias in the variance is small, even for a relatively high correlation
between bi and b w. For example, if the correlation between bi and b w is 0.2, which is high in this type of application,
then the relative bias in the standard error can be shown to be less than 10%.19
measure is that it is the closest to the empirical specifications employed by the studies discussed
here.
Parsons (1991). Parsons (1991) used the 1980-1981 National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth to study the employed workers' choice among employed search, unemployed search, and
not searching for a new job. Ordered probit models are employed for men and women. The wage
rates are specified in logarithms. The results show that current wages, promotion prospects, job
tenure (for men, not for women) and full-time work are each negatively associated with search
intensity (see Table 7).
Parsons (1991) found that workers searched more if they worked part-time. Thus the
average part-time worker prefers to work more hours than available on their current job. Hence,
the marginal rate of substitution of wage for leisure is less than the current wage rate (the
marginal rate of substitution of wage for leisure is equal to the wage rate provided that search
activity is (i) affected by the hourly wage rate and (ii) not affected by the number of work hours).
The results also indicate that the MWP for a full-time position is higher for men (65% of the
current wage) than for women (35% of the current wage). Such a finding is consistent with the
notion that men in the US (generally prefer to) work more hours than women. The results clearly
show that workers search significantly less if they expect to be promoted. Promotion
opportunities are highly valued by workers. 'Very good promotion prospects' are valued at 176%
for men and 225% for women. 'Good promotion prospects' are valued at 112% for men and 144%
for women. 'Not so good promotion prospects' are valued at 84% for men and at 42% for women
(the latter is not significant at conventional levels of significance). We find that the MWP for
promotion prospects is not so much gender dependent.
We will explain by application of search theory that these estimates of the MWP for
promotion prospects are plausible. To simplify matters, we suppose again a simplified model that
allows us to obtain an explicit solution for the MWP for promotion prospects. Suppose a worker
earns wage w and expects to be promoted at rate b. Promoted workers receive a wage w
p forever
(w
p > w). The worker discounts the future at rate r. Job-to-job mobility is ignored. Lifetime
utility V can then be written as (rw+bw
p)/r(r+b) and the MWP for b equals (w
p-w)/(r+b) (since
¶V/¶w = l/(r+b) and ¶V/¶b = (w
p-w)/( r+b)
2). So, the MWP for b is positive, and decreasing and
concave in b.
In Parson's (1991) empirical specification of job search behaviour, dummies for various20
levels of promotion prospects are included. Each dummy indicates a different level of b. So, the
MWP for a dummy can be interpreted as the willingness to pay (WP) for a certain level of b. The
willingness to pay for b, defined as [V(b)-V(0)]/¶V/¶w, can be written as b(w
p-w)/r. Now
suppose that the determinant 'very good promotion prospects' implies that b/r is 5. This seems
quite reasonable, for example, the yearly promotion rate b might be 0.50 and the yearly discount
rate r is 0.10. Since Parsons' (1991) empirical results indicate that the percent MWP for 'very
good promotion prospects' is about 200%, promoted workers receive a wage increase of 40%.
Such an estimate seems plausible (see Murphy, 1985; van Gameren, 1999).
Van Ophem (1991). Van Ophem (1991) used the 1985 OSA Labour Market Survey to
study the importance of nonwage attributes on the search decision of Dutch employees. The
results show that on-the-job search activity increases with unemployment expectations and
unpaid overtime, but decreases with wage and good promotion prospects. Different measures for
the predicted wage are used using a 'structural form' and 'reduced form' model. In the current
paper, we report the MWP estimates for job attributes based on the 'reduced form' model (see
Table 8) (the MWP estimates based on the 'structural form' model are larger in absolute value).
Van Ophem (1991) reports that workers search more if they work unpaid overtime and expect to
become unemployed within a year. Workers search less if they have good promotion prospects.
25
The workers' MWP for the absence of unpaid overtime (measured in hours per week) is 4.75% of
the weekly wage. In the Netherlands, the average employed individual works about 35 hours per
week. Thus, the percent MWP for the absence of one hour unpaid overtime is not significantly
different from 100 (at the 5% level), which implies that the marginal rate of substitution of wage
for leisure equals the wage rate.
                                                       
25 Van Ophem (1991) also includes commuting time. Unfortunately, the standard error of the MWP estimate is so
high that interpretation is hazardous.21
Van Ophem (1991) includes a determinant of search activity defined as 'the expectation of
becoming unemp1oyed within 12 months'. The MWP for the absence of this expectation is about
147% of the wage rate. Consequently, Dutch workers who expect to become unemployed within
12 months anticipate a substantial loss. This is likely to be due to low re-employment
probabilities in the Dutch labour market in the mid eighties, since the direct loss in income is
relatively small in the Netherlands. Using again the simple search model (see section 7.3), we
will show that the Dutch estimates are plausible.
We assume now that the annual value of l is 0.66 and of r is 0.10. The expected duration
of being unemployed after losing the job is then 1.5 years, which corresponds to the average
Dutch unemployment duration during the period 1983-1987 (Gorter et al., 1990). The
determinant ‘the expectation of becoming unemployed within a year’ seems to indicate a large
yearly separation rate. We assume that the annual value of d is three (the probability of becoming
unemployed within a year is then 0.90). In 1985, the Dutch unemployment insurance payment
initially amounted to 80% of the most recently earned wage, however, this was reduced after a
maximum of six months. Thus, the loss in earnings is much more than 20%. For simplicity, we
assume that the loss is 30%. Given these assumptions, the WP for the absence of d is 118%. Such
a number is not too far from the 147% implied by the results reported by Van Ophem (1991).
Clearly, higher re-employment rates l imply a lower WP for the absence of d, since the expected
duration of being unemployed is shorter. In the case that l is one, the WP for the absence of d is
59%. Furthermore, the marginal willingness to pay for the absence of d is decreasing in l and in
d. In the case that l is 0.66 and r is 0.10, the percent MWP for the absence of the yearly
separation rate d decreases from 39% (d = 0) to 2.5% (d = 10). Finally, and in line with the
estimates implied by the results of Parsons (1991), Van Ophem reports that ‘good promotion
prospects’ are valued at about the current wage rate (MWP is 97% of the wage). As argued
before, this result is plausible. Given the noted differences between the studies, this suggests that
the estimation method generates robust results among different studies.
8.2. Unemployed job search
Barron and Mellow (1979). Barron and Mellow (1979) used a special survey among a sample of
the unemployed respondents in the May 1976 U.S. Current Population Survey, to study the
unemployed individual’s choice of how much time to devote to searching for a job. Particular22
attention was paid to the role of unemployment insurance benefits and to individuals who have
recently been (temporarily) laid off. Regression models are employed for the full sample and for
a sample restricted to individuals entering unemployment from prior jobs. The weekly insurance
benefits are assumed to affect search time linearly. Dummies are used for ‘expected recall, within
30 days’ and ‘expected recall, no period specified’. The results show that the unemployment
insurance benefits and recall expectations reduce unemployment search time. In Table 3, the
results are given for the sample restricted to individuals entering unemployment from prior jobs
(the results for the full sample imply somewhat higher – but less significant – MWP estimates).
The MWP for expected recall within 30 days is 313 dollars, which is about four times the
average weekly benefit (for the 31% receiving benefits, the mean is 77 dollars). Therefore
unemployed individuals are willing to forgo benefit for a month to receive a recall within a
month. The MWP for expected recall when the period is not known is 144 dollars, almost twice
the average weekly benefit.
Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1993). Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1993) used a random
sample drawn from the 1982-1984 administrative records of the Dutch unemployment benefit
administration for the Leiden district to study the determinants of search effort. One of the
determinants is the residual entitlement period of receiving unemployment benefit. Under the
Dutch Unemployment Act, the benefit level considered is approximately 80% of gross earnings
before unemployment. The length in days of unemployment benefit entitlement depends on the
number of days worked. The maximum benefit duration is 26 weeks. At the end of the
unemployment entitlement period, the benefit drops to 94% of the benefit level (75% of previous
earnings). Depending on the length of the prior job, the unemployed will receive this benefit for a
certain period. Ultimately, the unemployed receive welfare, which is generally substantially less
than the benefit and which does not depend on previous income. Search effort is measured by the
number of search contacts. The analysis is based on a Poisson model. The results show that
search effort declines significantly with increasing benefit levels, and rises over the residual
entitlement period (see Table 4).
 These results imply that the MWP as a percentage of the benefit for residual entitlement
(in weeks) is equal to 13.33% -0.26% times the residual entitlement period. Hence, the MWP for
residual entitlement is positive over the entitlement period (maximally 26 weeks) and increases at
a weekly rate of 0.26% of the benefit as the end of the entitlement period comes near. The23
willingness to pay for one week extra residual entitlement, at the beginning of entitlement, is 6%
of the benefit level. The willingness to pay for one week extra residual entitlement, at the end of
the entitlement period, is 13% of the benefit level. The empirical outcomes seem quite plausible,
since, as explained above, at the end of the entitlement period considered, unemployed
individuals lose at least six percent of the benefit for a certain period and, after this period the
benefit will be reduced to welfare level.
9. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have demonstrated that the marginal willingness to pay for job attributes can be
derived from data on on-the-job search activity. The main advantage of this estimation method,
compared to estimation methods based on job moves, is that one needs less restrictive
assumptions on the search environment. The empirical relevance of the search approach to
estimate the workers' marginal willingness to pay is applied to observations from Lithuania and
further demonstrated based on a number of studies in the U.S. and the Netherlands. We have
provided evidence, that workers attach substantial value to non-wage differences between jobs
like unpaid overtime, risk of becoming unemployed and promotion prospects. Furthermore, we
demonstrate that data on unemployed individuals’ search behaviour may be useful in obtaining
information on the value of unemployment attributes such as recall opportunities and the residual
entitlement period of receiving unemployment benefit.24
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                                   Table 1. Incidence of on-the-job search in Lithuania, 2000.
Employees All Men Women
All  8.8 9.6   8.1
Full-time  7.2 8.3   5.9
of which:    Tenure £ 6 months 13.9 14.4 13.1
                   Tenure 2 – 5 years  7.3   8.5   5.9
                   Tenure ‡ 15 years   2.9   2.8 3.0
Part-time (less than 32 hours) 23.6 34.7 19.0
Temporary contracts 45.5 53.1 32.6
Of which:                 £ 6 months 47.9 55.0 35.9
                                 > 6 months 39.2 48.1 23.6
Night work 9.3 10.9 6.5
Weekends work  (excluding nights) 10.6 11.4 10.8
Source: LFS data and own calculation.
Table 2. On-the-job search by reason in Lithuania, 2000.                            
                                                percent
Employees
Reasons All Men Women Part-time Temporary
1 Risk or certainty of loss of
present job / transitional job
    19.3     21.5     17.0 17.0        64.7
2 Seeking more hours     20.3     20.0     20.6 39.3          7.2
3 Wish to have better working
conditions, pay etc.
    52.7    51.8    53.6 42.1       25.2
4 Other     7.8      6.8     8.8 1.6         2.9
Source: LFS data and own calculation.28
Table 3. Determinants of on-the-job search and MWP
estimates for job attributes in Lithuania, 2000.




a 6.354 -1.042 (0.193)***
Temporary job 0.041 1.946 (0.299)*** -187*** (46.1)
Night work
b 0.165 0.584 (0.269)**  -56** (28.0)
Weekends
c 0.320 0.358 (0.204)*  -34* (20.5)
Working hours 38.2 -0.092 (0.030)***   3.4*** (1.4)
Hours sq. (coef. · 100) 1512 0.075 (0.035)**
Firm characteristics
Plant size   1-10 empl. 0.173 0.102 (0.240)
Plant size 11-19 empl. 0.089 0.125 (0.292)




d, % 2.2 0.019 (0.011)*
Local unemployment rate
e, % 15.1 0.085 (0.028)***
Worker characteristics
Tenure 8.0 -0.033 (0.032)
Tenure sq. (coef. · 100) 145.8 0.072 (0.001)
Age 39.7 -0.031 (0.009)***
Resident of capital city 0.197 0.960 (0.233)***
Rural resident 0.199 -0.619 (0.284)**
Female 0.517 -0.226 (0.198)
Ethnic minority 0.156 -0.383 (0.257)
Single 0.191 -0.342 (0.244)
Divorced 0.102 0.511 (0.299)*
Tertiary education 0.515 0.999 (0.432)**
Secondary education 0.368 0.524 (0.433)
Vocational education 0.035 0.652 (0.527)
Constant 5.219 (1.499)***
Number of observations   2641;       F(23,1580) = 9.21
 Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
aNet monthly earnings in Litas (1 Litas =0.25USD). 
bNight work = 1 if
respondents works at night (sometimes or usually). 
cWeekends = 1 if respondent works on Saturdays or Sundays
usually or occasionally, and does not work at nights. The reason for excluding nights is that most respondents who
work at night also work on weekends.  
dGender specific percentage fall (+) or growth (-) in employment by 15 major
NACE sectors, according to Labour Exchange data. Varies from –28 to 22. 
eGender specific unemployment rate
(percent) according to November 1999 LFS  in the county where respondent’s main job is located. Varies from 10 to
24. Other specifications (unemployment rate in the county of residence; registered rather than LFS unemployment
rate) give similar but less significant results.
***, **, * - estimates significant respectively at 1%, 5%, 10% level.29
Table 4. MWP for job attributes, percent of net monthly wage in
Lithuania, 2000. Alternative specifications.  
Job attributes   Mean (1) (2) (3) (4)
Temporary job 0.041   -187
b -163
    (47) (53)
Temporary job (‘involuntarily’) 0.026 -188
b
(55)
Temporary job (‘voluntarily’) 0.015 -82
b
(50)




    (51) (53) (53) (64)




    (52) (51) (47) (53)
Temp. job · contract duration       5.9
a   6.0
      (5.4)
Short contract · contract duration       6.8   14.9  26.6
      (14.6)  (16.9)
Long contract · contract duration                                                                                     1.5             -0.7
                                                                                                                                         (17.4)      (18.7)
Number of observations: 2641, of which 208 search.
Notes: Specification (1) distinguishes between workers with temporary contract durations up to 6 months and
contract durations of more than 6 months (long contracts). Specification (2) includes a dummy for temporary jobs
and a contract duration variable. Specification (3) uses a spline contract duration variable to test whether the MWP is
higher for short contracts. Specification (4) uses subjective information on the reason why the contract worker is
temporarily employed, distinguishing between ‘involuntarily temporary contracts’ and ‘voluntarily temporary
contracts’. Standard errors in parentheses.  
aMean is given for temporary contracts. 
bThe MWP estimates for
temporary jobs (less than 6 months and more than 6 months) in specifications (2) and (3) are  based on estimated
coefficients for temporary job dummy and contract duration variables, and mean contract durations for each
category. These specifications do not include dummies for temporary job with contract duration ￿ 6 months and > 6;
respective MWP.30
Table 5. MWP for job attributes by gender,
 percent of net monthly wage in Lithuania, 2000.






Temporary job -187*** -183*** -238*** -255*** -142*** -128***
Night work -56** -52** -70** -82**   -25 -26
Weekends (excl. Nights) -34*     -28    -44     -41    -29 -22
Hours worked     3.4**    3.0**    2.9**    3.7**   2.5* 2.0
Correlation    -0.30 0.96 -0.57
(std. Err.)   (0.37) 0.07    (0.23)
No. of observations 2641 3174 1266 1568 1375 1606
No. of employed 2641 2641 1266 1266 1375 1375
     of which searchers 208 208 112 112 96 96
Notes: 
aEstimates are identical to the estimates reported in Table 3. 
bEstimates from bivariate probit models with
sample selection from labour force into employment. Instruments used in the selection equation in models (2), (4),
(6) include dummies for non-manual workers, ethnic minority (removed from search equation) and additional
education categories. Additional instruments used for robustness check: dummy for being born abroad in model (2);
dummy for ongoing education or training in models (2), (4) (6); dummy for living in hostel in model (6) did not
change the results. Correlations reported show that unobserved characteristics, which promote employability have a
negative effect on probability of search for female employees and very strong positive effect for male employees (in
both cases significant at 5%). In the pooled sample correlation is negative but not significant.
 ***, **, * - estimates significant respectively at 1%, 5%, 10% level.31




Temporary job -0.1404 0.0555 ***
Night work 0.0092 0.0283
Weekends -0.0446 0.0230 **
Hours 0.0450 0.0059 ***
Hours sq. (coef. · 100) -0.0393 0.0001 ***
Firm characteristics
Plant size   1-10 empl. -0.1873 0.0260 ***
Plant size 11-19 empl. -0.1234 0.0329 ***
Plant size 20-49 empl. -0.0940 0.0284 ***
Search environment
Decline of sector employment
1999-2000, % -0.0046 0.0012 ***
Local unemployment rate, % -0.0017 0.0029
Worker characteristics
Tenure 0.0183 0.0035 ***
Tenure sq. (coef. · 100) -0.0003 0.0001 ***
Age -0.0024 0.0010
Resident of capital city 0.1956 0.0308 ***
Rural resident -0.0917 0.0243 ***
Female -0.2206 0.0220 ***
Ethnic minority -0.1124 0.0300 ***
Single -0.0320 0.0269
Divorced 0.0018 0.0302
Tertiary education 0.4792 0.0341 ***
Secondary education 0.1796 0.0316 ***
Vocational education -0.0460 0.0605
Constant 5.1433 0.1403 ***
Number of observations 2641
R
2 0.3576
Notes: Wages specified in logarithm. See, further, the notes from Table 3.
***, **, * - estimates significant respectively at 1%, 5%, 10% level.32
Table 7. Coefficients of search activity (encompasses search plans) with respect to attributes, out-of-school,
aged between 17 and 23, U.S., 1980-1981 (based on Parsons, 1991) and the marginal willingness to pay for job
attributes.
Men Women
Variables Coefficient % MWP Coefficient % MWP




























     Notes: standard errors in parentheses. a: significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level; b: significantly
different from zero at the 0.05 level; c: significantly different from zero at the 0.10 level.33
Table 8. Coefficients of search with respect to job attributes, The Netherlands, 1985 (based on Van Ophem,
1991) and the present marginal willingness to pay for job attributes.
Variables coefficient %MWP
 log wage rate -0.442
(0.165)
a












      Notes: standard errors in parentheses. a: significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level; b: significantly
different from zero at the 0.10 level.34
Table 9. Coefficients of search time (search hours per week) with respect to attributes of unemployed
individuals entering unemployment from prior jobs in 1976, U.S. (based on Barron and Mellow, 1979) and the
marginal willingness to pay for unemployment attributes.
variables Coefficient MWP/AWB MWP
 weekly insurance benefit -0.019
(0.006)
a
 expected recall, -5.950 4.065 313.158




 expected recall, -2.740 1.873 144.211




     Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. a: significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level; b: significantly
different from zero at the 0.05 level. AWB: average weekly benefit.35
Table 10. Coefficients of search contacts of unemployed individuals receiving unemployment benefit in 1982-
1984, Leiden, The Netherlands (based on Lindeboom and Theeuwes, 1993) and the marginal willingness to
pay for unemployment attributes as a percentage of the benefit.
variables Coefficient %MWP
 log benefit -0.27
(0.031)
a




 (residual entitlement period)




   Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. a: insignificantly different from zero at the 0.01 level.
Residual entitlement period measured in weeks.2008
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